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"WE DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH": THE CONSTITUTION
AS LITERARY TEXT
ROBERT A. FERGUSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution is many things, but it is first a written text,
words arranged for all to read. The text becomes the living Consti-
tution, a metaphor of enduring strength, when past and present
unite in the further act of interpretation. It follows that effective
interpretation requires a continuity of historical understanding.
The language of 1787 must reach the problems of the moment in a
way that will satisfy both. At the same time, the actual process of
interpretation always begins in the words of the text. The Consti-
tution "lives" in the vitality of its language. Most readers accept
these preliminaries as elements of consensus in constitutional in-
terpretation. Arguments begin when specific integrations of past
and present create differences about the scope, intent, and con-
struction of constitutional language. They do so, however, precisely
because the consensus just noted is less informed than it appears
to be.
Constitutional debates ultimately flow from fundamental uncer-
tainties about the vitality of constitutional language. In what man-
ner do the statements of 1787 control the modern nation state?
How do original intentions apply to unforeseen consequences?
Where are the permissions in clauses that are so deliberately cir-
cumspect? Can the Founders be wrong on certain issues? We have
learned that such questions do not lend themselves to sharp legal-
istic distinctions. The answers turn instead on more implicit as-
sumptions about the nature of constitutional language, and these
assumptions generally go untested. The purpose of this essay, ac-
cordingly, is not to engage in current debates-whatever their
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timeliness or importance-but rather to encourage a re-examina-
tion of the underlying assumptions where fears begin.
The nature of constitutional language is a poorly understood
subject because so seldom examined on its own terms and in its
own context. Arguments about the use of given words have
stripped phraseology of its original complexity, the very source of
vitality. Readers of the Constitution should remember that writing
thrives on a wealth of circumstances well beyond authorial intent.
The framers of the Constitution enter Philadelphia as accom-
plished eighteenth-century men of letters with a large number of
specific skills to justify that description. What are those skills and
what do they suggest about the presumed capacity of language?
What do the framers think they can do in 1787? What is their un-
derstanding of the text they strive for, and how does that under-
standing change in a long summer of debate and documentary ex-
change? The power of language lies in the particulars of perceived
possibilities and in the manipulations and methodologies of style,
tone, genre, and substance that expand those possibilities. These
elements, properly understood as the Founders' literary skills, re-
present a neglected source of the living Constitution.
II. THE LITERATURE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Closer attention to the developing genre of public documents in
the Revolutionary era reveals a great deal about the actual craft in
such writings. Between 1776 and 1787 the Founders become less
convinced about the self evidence of truth. The weakness of the
Confederation, growing factionalism, Shays's rebellion, economic
depression-the very facts that bring the Founders to Philadelphia
in 1787-also make them less certain of agreement and more wor-
ried about the textual basis on which agreement might rest. One
important consistency, however, remains: the writers of both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution believe in the
text as the basis or foundation of all agreement. Growing uncer-
tainties within this underlying faith create a strange aesthetic of
control in the writing of the Constitution. The interpenetration ap-
pears most clearly in Benjamin Franklin's famous closures as he
signs first the Declaration of Independence and then, eleven years
later, the new Constitution of federal union.
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Signing the Declaration, Franklin observes, "we must, indeed, all
hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately."1
The Declaration functions as both the artifice behind Franklin's
witticism and the artifact of the solemnly sworn policy that he
enunciates. The Founders not only hang together, they swear to do
so in the Declaration, and their oath guarantees the "facts" they
submit to "a candid world."' 2 This oath-"we mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor" 3-is
then figuralized or mirrored in the grouped signatures that con-
clude the document. The world is "candid" because it will accept
facts as given and because it will further accept a right of revolu-
tion based on them. Facts are submitted, again in the Founders'
words, "to prove this."'4
In 1787, incontestable facts, let alone proofs, are much harder to
come by. Placed in the same ceremonial situation at the Constitu-
tional Convention, Franklin achieves a similar certainty in the doc-
ument being signed but by a far more circuitous route. James
Madison describes the event:
Whilst the last members were signing [the Constitution]
Doctr. Franklin looking towards the Presidents Chair, at the
back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed to a
few members near him, that Painters had found it difficult to
distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. I have, said
he, often and often in the course of the Session, and the vicissi-
tudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that be-
hind the President without being able to tell whether it was ris-
ing or setting: But now at length I have the happiness to know
that it is a rising and not a setting Sun.5
The world may not have changed for Franklin by 1787, but repre-
sentations within it surely have. Franklin's assumed text in his an-
ecdote, the artist's painting, is hopelessly ambiguous without a
1. 1 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 408 (J. Sparks ed. 1840).
2. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 1 THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 73 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinaf-
ter Jensen].
3. Id. at para. 32 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1 Jensen, supra note 2, at 75.
4. Id. at para. 2, reprinted in 1 Jensen, supra note 2, at 73.
5. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 648 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966)
[hereinafter Farrand].
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larger context: men can and will differ over whether it depicts a
rising or a setting sun just as the delegates themselves have dif-
fered in a final argument over whether the new Constitution will
mean prosperity and peace for America or anarchy and civil
convulsion.
Franklin, in fact, has taken a central role in these last-minute
bickerings, and the substance of his contribution has been to raise
the prospect of an unavoidable epistemological uncertainty. "For
having lived long," he tells the Convention, "I have experienced
many instances of being obliged ... to change opinions even on
important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be
otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am
to doubt my own judgment .. ."6 The point of this comment is to
encourage his divided colleagues to settle for an "apparent una-
nimity" where "real" accord is impossible and to urge them to in-
corporate that subterfuge into the Constitution itself.7 Knowing
that the delegates are divided, that they cannot hang together,
Franklin successfully moves that the Constitution be approved "by
the unanimous consent of the States present,"8 the majority of
each delegation being for ratification.'
In accepting Franklin's "convenient" motion, the Founders see,
articulate, and welcome its "ambiguous form."'10 Unanimity is, of
course, a lie. Three leading members of the Convention-Edmund
Randolph, Elbridge Gerry, and George Mason-refuse to sign the
Constitution on the final day of the Convention, and at least three
others-Luther Martin, Robert Yates, and John Lansing,
Jr.-withdraw earlier because of their unhappiness with the
emerging document. The unanimity injected into the language of
the Constitution is instead a useful fiction, a myth of glorious har-
mony that the Founders wield in the ideological struggle to first
elicit and then enforce allegiance in the process of ratification."
Significantly, the notion of unanimity can be mobilized without
6. Id. at 641-42.
7. Id. at 643.
8. Id. (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 641-47.
10. Id. at 643.
11. I use the concept of ideology in its formal critical rather than its pejorative sense. It
refers to the structure of values and interests that informs any particular representation of
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hypocrisy in this fashion because the text itself has been accepted
as an inevitable repository of epistemological ambiguities. Philo-
sophical uncertainty, in Franklin's sense, has become a vital source
of political flexibility and literary creativity.
Franklin's strangely useful pessimism might appear idiosyncratic
but for the fact that it is shared, even amplified, by a far more
important leader of the Convention-by James Madison, Father of
the Constitution. At issue is how a writer turns a necessarily am-
biguous text into an effective tool of ideological conformity within
a divided world. Certainly, the whole problem of consensus is a
vexing one in Madison's writings. The most famous Federalist pa-
per, No. 10, may indeed argue that disagreement and faction will
yield to "the extent and proper structure of the Union,"12 but The
Federalist No. 37, also from Madison's pen, reveals paralyzing
philosophical uncertainties that call the entire realm of human
agreement into question. Here, in one of the darkest thrusts of the
American Enlightenment, Madison describes three intruding levels
of chaos in human existence: "the obscurity arising from the com-
plexity of objects," "the imperfection of the human faculties," and
the failure of language itself-"the medium through which the
conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh
embarrassment."'1 3
When these elements are compounded in the actual process of
human perception-"indistinctness of the. object, imperfection of
the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of
ideas"-we are left with a world of impenetrable "gloom," one
filled with "dark and degraded pictures which display the infirmi-
ties and depravities of the human character."'1 4 This world is so
impoverished with its "discordant opinions," "mutual jealousies
. . . factions, contentions, and disappointments" that Madison's
"man of candor" regards mere agreement with surprise and the
presumed unanimity of the Constitutional Convention with "won-
reality and to the inevitable process of hegemony by which that representation elicits or
enforces allegiance to a given social order.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 23 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 101 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981).
14. Id. at 102.
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der" and "astonishment. '15 Only "a finger of that Almighty hand"
can have supplied such a level of understanding in mere men."6
The point of The Federalist No. 37 is that real agreement be-
comes impossible without imposed manipulation and design-a
manipulation and design that we can trace to the pen of Madison
as easily as he has traced them to the finger of God. The mythic
gloss in Madison's statement trades on the notion that unanimity
in the community of saints comes closest to the will of God, but
the substructure of his statement, and particularly the metaphor
about a guiding finger, suggests how the actual writing of the Con-
stitution involves an aesthetic of conscious control, how the docu-
ment itself depends on questions of craft and even guile. The Con-
stitution, to turn one last time to the language of The Federalist
No. 37, operates as a place where "theoretical propriety" and "ex-
traneous considerations" meet and where a molding hand resolves
the difference. 17
How are we to know that the Constitution represents a rising
and not a setting sun? What is it about the text itself that leads
fallible observers to the same conclusion? The rhetoric of the
Founders urges us to answer these questions by thinking of the
Constitution as the expression of a shared truth devised by the
elected representatives of an enlightened people. We are urged, in
other words, to mystify the text in question. Quite another set of
answers comes to mind if we think of the text as created text, as a
manipulated and manipulative work, as the imposed truth of a
conscious and philosophically sophisticated elite, as the concrete
product of James Madison, Edmund Randolph, James Wilson, and
Gouverneur Morris-the four men who actually wrote succeeding
drafts from the Virginia Plan of late May, through the Report of
the Committee of the Whole in mid-June, to the copy reported by
the Committee of Detail in early August, to the Constitution as
submitted by the Committee of Style in mid-September. Within
this contextual focus, three forgotten elements can be used to illus-
trate the original vitality of the Constitution as an ideological
work: first, the craft within the writing itself; second, the delegates'
15. Id. at 103.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 102.
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clear shift in emphasis in the Convention from a working paper
that all are free to modify toward a public document that will not
bear subsequent intrusion; third, the visual importance of the Con-
stitution as a painting or icon to be viewed in a certain way.
The craft within the document is one of its most ignored fea-
tures."8 The Constitution is, among other things, a miracle of con-
cision, emerging as it does from four months of florid effusion and
often bitter debate. It contains just five thousand words of the
plainest prose cast in a one-sentence preamble and seven brief arti-
cles. Neither verbiage, nor allusion, nor admonition interrupts its
prescriptive clarity; there is very little linguistic novelty, almost no
philosophic innovation, and minimal elaboration. But these eva-
sions are counterbalanced by a series of more subtle commitments.
Brief rather than cryptic, the Constitution confirms a familiar past.
Every word belongs to the realm of common understanding in
eighteenth-century American experience, and many of them are
taken directly from the constitutions of the states and from the
Articles of Confederation in a reaffirmation of republican principle.
In the 1780s the state constitutions are the essential repositories of
an American identity. John Adams calls them the true history of
an emerging republicanism.' 9 Drafter in his own right of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution of 1780, he presents his personal writings
as "a specimen of that kind of reading and reasoning which pro-
duced the American constitutions.
20
Borrowings from the state constitutions are all the more impres-
sive because so discriminating; controversial terms like "national,"
"republic," and "federal" are carefully circumvented in the fram-
ers' document. Then, too, the many generalities of the Constitution
lie within a precise arrangement of tone and structure. The seven
articles are clearly deployed in descending order of length, concern,
and difficulty. The first three articles-on the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches-form the crux of the Constitution. Each
moves from description of a branch of government into issues of
18. For a more extended version of the analysis in this paragraph and the next, see R.
FERGUSON, LAW AND LErERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 59-64 (1984).
19. 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 283-85, 292-94 (C. Adams ed. 1851) [hereinafter C.
Adams].
20. Id. at 293-94.
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qualification and selection for office and then to an enumeration of
powers and limits.
Sometime in the rearrangement of twenty-three loose articles
into the tightened, final version of seven, the framers decide that
the document as such should never be opened to re-interpretation.
The Committee of Style presents the Constitution's ultimate
amendment clause with its stipulations on how subsequent changes
are to become "part thereof,"'21 a phrase subsequently changed to
"Part of this Constitution. '22 The word "part" in this case means
"extension." One need only compare such language with the rele-
vant clause in the Articles of Confederation, which allows for the
possibility of "alteration" within the articles themselves.2 3 Amend-
ments to the Constitution are added on to a document that re-
mains intact as a text despite every revision. The whole discussion
of constitutional change takes place amidst the framers' final deci-
sions to reject calls for a second convention and for the right of the
state ratifying conventions to alter constitutional language.2 " Their
debate deliberately leaves the people with just two alternatives,
"accepting or rejecting [the Constitution] in toto." 5 "Conven-
tions," observes a spokesman for the majority, "are serious things,
and ought not to be repeated." 6
Over and over again in the ensuing fight for ratification, the
Founders invoke the necessary uniqueness of the Convention to
encircle and seal off the language of their document.27 Meanwhile,
the Constitution itself mystifies that language in a literal portrait
of the new union. The famous preamble turns the people them-
selves into the authors of the Constitution by conflating the act of
writing with the process of ratification. Contrast, on the one hand,
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union . . .do ordain and establish"2" with, on the other, the
21. 2 Farrand, supra note 5, at 602.
22. U.S. CONST. art. V, reprinted in 1 Jensen, supra note 2, at 316.
23. AcT OF CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA art. XIII, reprinted in 1
Jensen, supra note 2, at 93.
24. 2 Farrand, supra note 5, at 629-33.
25. Id. at 646.
26. Id. at 632.
27. C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 274-98 (1966).
28. U.S. CONST. preamble, reprinted in I Jensen, supra note 2, at 306.
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more literal honesty but thoroughly diminished power of the open-
ing sentence of the Articles of Confederation-"To all to whom
these Presents shall come, we the under signed Delegates of the
States affixed to our Names send greeting. 29
The empowering presence of the people in the Constitution is
then joined by the specific articles of government to a conclusion
that portrays the union on the very face of the document. The
signers of the Constitution appear neither in alphabetical order nor
by presumed importance of seniority. They are grouped, instead,
by state, with the states themselves appearing in geographical or-
der from north to south, starting with New Hampshire in the north
and working in sequence through Georgia in the extreme south.
The United States thus appear on the page in familiar map
form-the perfect icon in answer to Madison's fears about indis-
tinct objects, imperfect perception, and faulty language.
This iconicity becomes literal in the Constitution makers' image
of their work and of themselves as "framing" and "framers." Most
famously, Madison, in The Federalist No. 51, uses "framing a gov-
ernment" to evoke the necessary controls, internal and external,
that distinguish a government of men from one of angels.30 The
metaphor, a general one in the discourse of the Founders, conjoins
act and object, creation and control, regularity and contrivance,
with the overarching notion of order as the ultimate source of
many different meanings. In Johnson's Dictionary of the English
Language, "frame" includes "to form or fabricate by orderly con-
struction and union of various parts," "to make," "to regulate," "to
invent," and, from the verb, "a fabrick, any thing constructed of
various parts or members," "any thing made so as to inclose or
admit something else," "[o]rder; regularity; adjusted series or dis-
position," "[s]cheme," "contrivance," "projection. ' ' "' The Constitu-
tion, the fabric of union, is all of these things, but most particu-
larly it encloses and, thereby, creates form in the midst of a
nameless chaos. Without the weaver's fabric, the frame signifies
only a void. Alexander Hamilton, no friend to the original plan,
29. ACT OF CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA preamble, reprinted in 1
Jensen, supra note 2, at 86.
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 50, at 160, (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981).
31. A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (S. Johnson 1st ed. 1755).
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turns these characteristics into the rallying call for ratification
when he asks, in the act of signing, "is it possible to deliberate
between anarchy and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of
good to be expected from the plan on the other[?] ' '32
The frame, together with the framers' effort, insists upon what
might be thought to be missing: recognizable form. As such, it is
both a claim of accomplishment and a rejection of prevalent fears.
The belief in boundaries behind the image eases the three central
innovations of the Constitution, all of which involve a chilling
open-endedness in conventional eighteenth-century political
thought. The amorphous and changeable people as the foundation
of all authority, the constitutional separation of powers in govern-
ment, and the sharing of sovereignty between the nation and states
do not lend themselves readily to unified form in the early Ameri-
can mind.
Framing is a visual aid for an assumed congruity. The eighty-five
Federalist papers build around this premise; they argue that the
new national fabric is indeed a uniformity woven of apposite parts
and not a weak tissue, not a mere contrivance. Inevitably, these
arguments require an act of faith to be accepted as proofs in the
troubled 1780s. In the ratification process, as Madison quickly
points out, who the framers are counts for more than what has
been framed.3 3 Of course, knowing and accepting the framers
means visual identity. Framing, with all of its literal implications
of craftsmanship and method and vision, feeds that identity, and
so, in a much smaller way, does a fortuitous parallel in Revolution-
ary parlance. The transposition of a single letter in terminology
lifts the landowning framers into the imagery of a happier and less
ambiguous realm-into that proverbial synonym for political
sincerity, the nation of farmers.
III. WRITING CONSTITUTIONS
The search for controlling images and other hegemonic devices
must be understood carefully. To recapture the conscious manipu-
lation that the Founders bring to the writing of the Constitution is
not to question James Madison's famous claim that "there never
32. 2 Farrand, supra note 5, at 646.
33. 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 355 (R. Rutland ed. 1977) [hereinafter Rutland].
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was an assembly of men, charged with a great and arduous trust,
who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or anx-
iously devoted to the object committed to them." 4 It is, however,
to give new depth to John Adams' equally famous claim that the
Constitution represents "the greatest single effort of national de-
liberation that the world has ever seen."35
We need to recover that act of deliberation in its fullest sense.
National deliberations rarely develop into intellectually impressive
events. This one stands out not just because of the oft-noted ge-
nius of its participants but because of their practiced talents as
men of letters. Between 1776 and 1784, every state except Rhode
Island and Connecticut writes and adopts a new constitution. Sev-
enteen new constitutions in all are written in America during the
course of the Revolution, and the very number contains the best
key to critical interpretation.
For only in repetition do the possibilities of a genre become ap-
parent. The quantum jump in quality of language and conception
between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution actu-
ally occurs step by step in state convention after state convention,
and it has as much to do with developing literary skill and the
mastery of a new art form as it does with political considerations.
Skill appears in the Founders' many shorthand references to state
constitutions during debate on the Convention floor; mastery, in
their self-confidence amidst every difficulty.
Actual articulations of difficulty illustrate the point perfectly.
Madison calls the Constitution "a task more difficult than can be
well concieved [sic] by those who were not concerned in the execu-
tion of it."38 Franklin compares it to an infinitely complex game of
chess in which every move is contested. 7 John Adams thinks of
thirteen clocks striking simultaneously, "a perfection of mecha-
nism, which no artist had ever before effected. '38 In every case, the
fact of difficulty gives way to a metaphoric projection of compe-
tence and accomplishment. Madison's executor of a task, Frank-
34. 3 Farrand, supra note 5, at 551.
35. 6 C. Adams, supra note 19, at 220.
36. 10 Rutland, supra note 33, at 208.
37. 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 658-59 (A. Smyth ed. 1907) [hereinafter
Smyth].
38. 10 C. Adams, supra note 19, at 283.
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lin's chess player, and Adams' artist know what to do and how to
do it. Thomas Jefferson best captures the self-confidence of 1787
when he writes, "[I]t is a part of the American character to con-
sider nothing as desperate; to surmount every difficulty by resolu-
tion and contrivance. '39 The combination is illuminating: resolu-
tion (an act of will) permits contrivance (the ability to invent order
in a crisis).
The Founders take the measure of their own growing ability in
the very first speech of the Convention. Edmund Randolph begins
his criticism of the Articles of Confederation by exonerating the
authors of that document for errors made "in the then infancy of
the science, of constitutions, & of confederacies."40 Obviously,
much has been learned in ten years, since the supposed infancy of
1777. A new sophistication in the science of constitutions, in the
knowledge of framing a government, has reduced a series of primal
uncertainties. What does it mean to write out a constitution when
the ideal model of the British Constitution presumes an unwritten
status? To whom does one address such a document amidst raging
debates about the locus and feasibility of sovereignty? How and
where, precisely, does fundamental law lie upon a page also dedi-
cated to the artificial machinery of modern government?
The many state constitutions that intervene between 1776 and
1787 curb the unfamiliar by placing it within familiar forms. In
effect, they bring the Founders to a greater awareness of genre.
The delegates at work in Philadelphia in 1787 remain collectively
committed to the sequent toil of successive drafts of the Constitu-
tion because they share a series of assumptions about the way nar-
rative, form, and style control unruly content. John Adams sees as
much in comparing "the art of lawgiving" to architecture and
painting.41 When he also notes that "the fabrication of constitu-
tions will be the occupation or the sport, the tragedy, comedy, or
farce, for the entertainment of the world for a century to come, '"42
we catch a rare glimpse of the aesthetic behind a major literary
achievement. Unmistakably, the eighteenth-century American
39. 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 251 (J. Boyd ed. 1955).
40. 1 Farrand, supra note 5, at 18.
41. 10 C. Adams, supra note 19, at 398.
42. Id. at 397.
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writer's originality-entertaining the world-comes in the litera-
ture of public documents.
The exact nature and development of the Founders' originality
are harder to pinpoint. We can begin by noting that even colonial
American constitutionalism differs from its English equivalent in
its commitment to the written word. The biblical conjunction of
sovereignty and the book of law, the need for an artificially im-
posed order in the American wilderness, and the politics of Anglo-
American relations all encourage a documentation of governmental
forms as the reference point of communal identity. Colonial Ameri-
cans respond to the uncertainty and sheer flimsiness of social
forms by inscribing fundamental law more generally, more fre-
quently, more compulsively. By way of contrast, their English
counterparts put fundamental law to paper mostly in the form of
individual rights and only when faced with an explicit political
challenge. Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights of 1689 provide the
standard examples. One must think about the difference within a
larger continuum: the general act of founding a wholly new society
turns an explicit political challenge into an ongoing social norm. In
this sense, the artifice of colonial charters, pacts, petitions, ordi-
nances, and constitutions represents a perpetual crisis in defini-
tion, a steady search for the words that will complete identity.
As a result, documents like the Mayflower Compact of 16204"
and the Ordinance and Constitution for Virginia of 162144 create
social and political structures as much as they assert individual
rights. The desire to "covenant and combine ourselves together
into a civil Body Politick ' 45 in the first instance, and "to settle
such a forme of government ' 46 in the second, requires a psychology
of framing. As the Mayflower Compact claims to "enact, consti-
tute, and frame. . . just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Con-
stitutions, and Officers," 47 so the Ordinance and Constitution for
43. 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1841 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter Thorpe].
44. 4 JAMESTOWN 350TH ANNIVERSARY HISTORICAL BOOKLETS 126-28 (E. Swem ed. 1957)
[hereinafter Swem].
45. 3 Thorpe, supra note 43, at 1841.
46. 4 Swem, supra note 44, at 126.
47. 3 Thorpe, supra note 43.
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Virginia strives "to make our Entrance, by ordaining & establish-
ing. . . supreame Counsells."'48 Significantly, both documents take
the form of a writing upon another writing. As responses in kind to
the charters of colonial incorporation from James I, King of Eng-
land, they engender intertextual tensions, operating at once as
glosses on the king's grant and as extensions of it.
IV. THE DEEPEST WORKINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
Taken together, the psychology of framing, the specific language
of ordination and establishment, and the textual mediation of
power received and power assumed are touchstones in measuring
the evolution of a writerly tradition in the literature of public doc-
uments. The extent of that evolution becomes clear in any compar-
ison of the concise but magisterial language of the federal Consti-
tution with the prolix, redundant, anxious, and often unreadable
prose of earlier official documents through the first state constitu-
tions and the Articles of Confederation.
Compare, for example, the preamble of the Constitution:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America49
with comparable wording, buried in the middle of the Virginia
Constitution of 1776:
We therefore, the delegates and representatives of the good peo-
ple of Virginia, having maturely considered the premises, and
viewing with great concern the deplorable conditions to which
this once happy country must be reduced, unless some regular,
adequate mode of civil polity is speedily adopted, and in compli-
ance with a recommendation of the General Congress, do ordain
and declare the future form of government of Virginia to be as
followeth.50
48. 4 Swem, supra note 44, at 126.
49. U.S. CONST. preamble, reprinted in 1 Jensen, supra note 2, at 306.
50. 7 Thorpe, supra note 43, at 3815.
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The difference between these passages is a matter of practice.
Every writer struggles through lesser works before a masterpiece
becomes possible. Just so the Founders prepare themselves in the
workshops of congressional and state assemblies. Forty of the fifty-
five delegates in Philadelphia already have served in both; half
that number have participated directly in the writing of state con-
stitutions and territorial ordinances.6 1
By 1787 the Founders have come to understand the deepest
workings of constitutional language. The hardest lesson, one that
the Committee of Detail articulates, involves simplicity. Edmund
Randolph and John Rutledge, for the committee, see the necessity
of a scope, style, and tone that will trust to form over detail. As
they draft a constitution that will be properly "fundamental," they
agree "[t]o use simple and precise language, and general proposi-
tions" and "[t]o insert essential principles only, lest the operations
of government should be clogged. ' 52 This spirit of restraint can
dominate the writing process precisely because it claims clarity of
form as its goal. Thus, Randolph and Rutledge distinguish sharply
between "the construction of a constitution" and the more open-
ended enumeration of mere law;53 only the former requires "the
shortest scheme that can be adopted. ' 54 The accessibility of the
Founders' document absolutely depends on this point. The federal
Constitution can be twice as clear as its forerunners-the Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780, for example-in part because it is
less than half as long.
Two other considerations reinforce the literary ability that the
Founders bring to Philadelphia. In 1787, a large majority of Ameri-
cans embrace the institutional arrangement of a national conven-
tion as the appropriate forum for considering national union.
Then, too, the delegates who attend the Convention conceive of
themselves as eighteenth-century gentlemen of letters. The politi-
cal legitimacy of the Convention insures the high quality of its par-
ticipants while reinforcing their self-confidence and mutual aware-
ness. Benjamin Franklin, George Mason, and James Madison all
51. C. ROSSITER, supra note 27, at 145-46.
52. 2 Farrand, supra note 5, at 137.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 150.
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write that they can hope for much from a Convention made up of
"the best contribution of talents the States could make for the oc-
casion. ' ' 5 The special nature of that occasion brings out the best in
the best. Virtually every delegate perceives a golden opportunity
and works that much harder to preserve it when troubles mount.
"It is a miracle that we are now here exercising our tranquil & free
deliberations on the subject," Hamilton observes in the difficult
days of late June. "It would be madness to trust to future
miracles. '57
The role of the gentleman of letters suggests a more subtle and
generally forgotten influence, one that enabled "the best contribu-
tion of talents" to understand and thrive upon itself. Much has
been made of the Founders' adept use of committee structures,
their secrecy and restraint before publication, their willingness to
suggest solutions without insisting on personal investment, and
their ability to compromise over language. The argument should be
made that these characteristics are what one can hope for in the
exemplary writers of the time. The true gentleman of letters privi-
leges reason over emotion, writes for a small group of social peers,
circulates drafts among those peers for correction, avoids publica-
tion until agreement is reached, and leaves his work unsigned. In
other words, the very qualities that critics cite as weaknesses in
early American fiction, poetry, and drama become strengths in the
literature of public documents. The retreat to committee arrange-
ments for compromise reveals only the most obvious of these
strengths.
Surely the most remarkable trait of the Convention has to do
with the delegation of sensitive writing tasks within committees to
obviously embattled figures like Edmund Randolph, James Wilson,
and Gouverneur Morris. These men take strong stands in debate
on the floor of the Convention, and yet their colleagues can trust
them to express something like the general will in the formal act of
writing by assignment. The official selflessness of the man of let-
ters is crucial in this frequent behavior pattern. Not until the
1830s do Americans learn for certain that the aristocratic, thor-
55. 3 Farrand, supra note 5, at 21, 32, 37.
56. 1 Id. at 467.
57. Id.
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oughly conservative Gouverneur Morris pens the final draft of the
Constitution. News of authorship in 1787 surely would have hurt
ratification, but Madison, a sometime opponent, knows that the
gentlemanly tradition minimizes the danger of publicity and con-
cludes "[a] better choice could not have been made, as the per-
formance of the task proved. '58 The spirit of the man of letters
channels authorial identity into a social or corporate orientation.
Madison captures the essence of that spirit later when he adds,
"[The Constitution] was not like the fabled Goddess of Wisdom,
the offspring of a single brain. It ought to be regarded as the work
of many heads and many hands.
59
Art manipulates the familiar to create the extraordinary. The
Founders' deft use of institutional legitimacies, established literary
norms, and other regular resources brings them together in what
Edmund Wilson calls "the shock of recognition,"60 the moment in
which genius takes its own measure in order to move beyond itself.
Viewed in this light, the Constitution is the ultimate expression of
the literature of public documents because, among other things, it
represents the crystallization of a genre. When "the many heads
and many hands" of the Convention are finished, constitutionalism
has taken on a different meaning. By identifying the nature of this
transformation, we come closer to understanding the Founders' ul-
timate creativity as they "ordain and establish" their document
over us.
V. THE CONSTITUTION AS SACRED TEXT
John Adams, from hindsight, describes the formative era as "the
age of revolutions and constitutions."6 1 The phrase contains a vital
expectation: namely, that constitutions cap revolutions. By the
middle 1780s, early republican leaders have assumed that constitu-
tional forms define revolutionary accomplishment and, thereby,
American culture itself. Benjamin Franklin and George Washing-
58. 3 Id. at 499.
59. Id. at 533.
60. THE SHOCK OF RECOGNITION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LITERATURE IN THE UNITED STATES
BY THE MEN WHO MADE IT V (E. Wilson ed. 1943) (quoting H. MELVILLE, HAWTHORNE AND
His MOSSES (1850)). "For genius, all over the world, stands hand in hand, and one shock of
recognition runs the whole circle round." Id.
61. 10 C. Adams, supra note 19, at 149.
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ton, the Fathers among the Fathers, say as much. Franklin's Infor-
mation to Those Who Would Remove to America6" in 1782 shows
how firmly the Founders trust the official word: "Those, who desire
to understand the State of Government in America, would do well
to read the Constitutions of the several States, and the Articles of
Confederation that bind the whole together. '63
Washington is even more explicit a year later in his farewell to
the army or Circular To The States.4 At the moment of highest
victory and celebration, the country's hero warns that "it is yet to
be decided, whether the Revolution must ultimately be considered
as a blessing or curse. '65 Political definition must follow military
action. The question remains, Washington asks his countrymen, "if
we have a disposition to seize the occasion and make it our own"
by giving "such a tone to our Federal Government, as will enable it
to answer the ends of its institution."6 The choice, an act of clari-
fication, is whether "to establish or ruin . ..national Character
forever.'6 7 Owning history means writing it down "in the Estab-
lishment of our forms of Government."68 The same language car-
ries easily to the Convention floor just four years later. Madison
and Hamilton announce that they are "digesting a plan which in
its operation [will] decide forever the fate of Republican Govt."69
Gouverneur Morris thinks of himself not just as "a Representative
of America" but as "a Representative of the whole human race; for
the whole human race will be affected by the proceedings of this
Convention. '70
The Founders' rhetoric puts enormous pressure on the plan they
actually digest. If ordaining and establishing a republican form of
government in America at the end of the eighteenth century pos-
sesses cosmic significance, then the artifact of ordination and es-
62. B. FRANKLIN, Information to Those Who Would Remove to America, in 8 Smythe,
supra note 37, at 603.
63. Id. at 610-12.
64. G. WASHINGTON, Circular To The States, in 26 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
483 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1938).
65. Id. at 486.
66. Id. at 485-86.
67. Id. at 486.
68. Id. at 485.
69. 1 Farrand, supra note 5, at 423-24.
70. Id. at 529.
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tablishment, the document itself, becomes holy writ. The shift that
such logic requires occurs naturally enough during the fight for rat-
ification, but the basic transition is already in place in the Phila-
delphia Convention. In its simplest form, this transition turns the
text of the Constitution into a repository of moral value. Republi-
can virtue resides not in the act of clarification, Washington's for-
mulation, but in the clarified result. The Constitution becomes not
a symptom of virtue but virtue itself.
John Adams, writing his Defence of the Constitutions71 in the
same year, shows the way by insisting that constitutionalism en-
ables virtue and not vice versa. "The best republics will be virtu-
ous, and have been so," he argues, "but we may hazard a conjec-
ture, that the virtues have been the effect of the well ordered
constitution, rather than the cause." 2 Adams and other early re-
publican intellectuals use their readings in British empirical
thought to claim that institutions, rather than the manners and
morals of a people, guarantee good government. 3 What they add
on their own in 1787 and after is the notion that a piece of paper,
the text of the Constitution, can be construed as such an institu-
tion-indeed, the central one. The shift involved in this idea is at
once simple and subtle: on the one hand, it legitimates a firmer
union; on the other, it creates a lasting tension and potential diffi-
culty. From this moment, the Constitution as process lives in com-
petition with a very different notion of the Constitution as artifact,
as enclosed institutional form. All subsequent readers face the
problem of defining the flexibility of the former within the rigidi-
ties of the latter.
On the Convention floor, the projected unanimity of the saints
or miracle of consensus literalizes the Constitution as sacred text
and central institution. The language of the actual document is de-
liberately, even obsessively secular. Nevertheless, the Constitution
71. J. ADAMS, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America, in 6 C. Adams, supra note 19.
72. Id. at 219-20.
73. Scholars have traced the Founders' stress on institutions to British empirical philoso-
phy in general and to the work of David Hume in particular. See F. McDONALD, Novus
ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 211 (1985); see generally
G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA. THE FEDERALIST (1981) (general analysis of the importance
of Hume).
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as artifact enters at once into the ceremonies of an American civil
religion, what Robert N. Bellah has termed "a collection of beliefs,
symbols, and rituals with respect to sacred things. '74 This happens
in part because of now-forgotten evangelical strands at work in the
period. The powerful religious dimensions embedded in the politi-
cal culture of early America control initial intellectual access to the
Constitution in ways that scholars are only beginning to under-
stand.75 More important, for immediate purposes, the Founders
quickly make use of those dimensions. Their own remarkable suc-
cess becomes a providential sign, one that dictates acceptance by a
republican citizenry in proof of its virtue. When, a month after the
Convention, Madison writes that "it is impossible to consider the
degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a mira-
cle, ' '"7 he means that events transcend every rational prediction of
the secular Enlightenment. Miracles partake of the sacred, and
they encourage acceptance over explanation.
As they leave the Convention, the Founders make acceptance of
the miracle of consensus a test of personal and communal salva-
tion. Washington's letter delivering the Constitution from the Con-
vention to Congress plays upon the point in form, style, and con-
tent. Sent "[b]y unanimous Order of the Convention," this letter
addresses a particularity, Sir, from the enlarged perspective of the
undifferentiated, first-person plural pronoun: "Sir,. . . In all our
deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that
which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American,
the consolidation of our Union. . . . ",7 The litany of pronominal
possessives conflates Founder and ordinary citizen, "our delibera-
tions" and "our view" referring to the Founders' decisions but
merging with "our Union," the perspective of every true American.
Washington then alludes to differences that might be expected but
that never materialize because of the presence of this true Ameri-
can perspective. In Washington's words, "the Constitution, which
74. R. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 175
(1970).
75. Botein, Religious Dimensions of the Early American State, in BEYOND CONFEDERA-
TION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 315-30 (1987).
76. 10 Rutland, supra note 33, at 208.
77. 2 Farrand, supra note 5, at 666-67.
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we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity. '7 8 Those who
would disagree with the document must remember that it is con-
structed out of "mutual deference and concession," and therefore
"is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been ex-
pected. 17 9 The acceptable exceptions have been made. A challenge
to any part of the final document violates the decorum of amity,
forgets "the greatest interest of every true American," and endan-
gers "prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."80
Washington's words follow the tactic already traced in the pre-
amble of the Constitution, and they prefigure the Founders' larger
strategy in the ratification debates. Agreement with the document
looms as the one acceptable interpretation of it. The people share
in the act of writing through the related act of ratification. The
Founders contribute to the sacred text of the Constitution by mak-
ing it scriptural, answerable through assent. With nothing less than
national existence at stake, the Constitution as process and the
Constitution as artifact become one. How they apply as one is per-
haps the single most important lesson that the continuity of his-
tory can teach in constitutional interpretation. Fortunately, the
very ratification process that engenders the Founders' strategy also
creates, in debate, a useful tension between process.and artifact.
The Constitution lives in the ongoing dialectic of that tension.
Among the Founders, Madison does the most after ratification to
keep the sacred text of the Constitution safely within Washing-
ton's spirit of amity-amity, in this case, taking the politicized pre-
fix of unanimity or union. "The citizens of the United States,"
writes Madison in 1792, "have peculiar motives to support the en-
ergy of their constitutional charters.""' The complexity of the
American system "requires a more than common reverence for the
authority which is to preserve order thro' the whole." 2 In turn, the
"great charters" of government are the worthiest objects of rever-
ence because "[a]s metes and bounds of government, they tran-
scend all other land-marks."8 3 They are the ultimate sources of
78. Id. at 667.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 14 Rutland, supra note 33, at 191 (1983).
82. Id. at 192.
83. Id. at 191.
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
definition in a culture. As such, texts like the Constitution require
more than understanding. The citizen's highest duty is to protect
and preserve "the importance of instruments, every word of which
decides a question between power and liberty. 8 4 Public opinion,
Madison concludes, "should guarantee, with a holy zeal, these po-
litical scriptures from every attempt to add to or diminish from
them."5
VI. CONCLUSION
Virtually every aspect of Madison's language of "political scrip-
tures" remains vital in contemporary American ideology. I raise
that language not to disagree with it but rather to demonstrate
how it must fit within an explicitly text-oriented culture. The
amalgamation of political and religious terminology in Madison's
discourse is a telling one. From Bible to Constitution to court case,
Americans of every century have turned to special writings as the
comprehensive and comprehensible units of meaning in thinking
about identity and cultural change. Specific, valorized texts have
contained the spiritual types, political principles, or legal deci-
sions-sometimes all three-that define reality and allow an ap-
propriate response thereto.
The tensions in a text-oriented approach to America are real and
unavoidable. Every attempt to understand the New World has pit-
ted scrutiny of the word against the nature of experience. Resort to
a paradigmatic text must also answer conflicting demands, includ-
ing the search for ideals, the need to substitute language for social
forms, and the American compulsion to begin history over again.
Traditionally, the greater one's ability to interpret the privileged
texts of the culture, the greater one's stature in commenting on the
American dream. From the first, the capacity to interpret has ena-
bled the dream. The problem with such an orientation is that it
demands a tenacious mastery of the complexities of interpretation
as well as the more customary reiteration of ideals.
The Founders' vision of consolidation is literally nothing without
their ability to interpret and wield language. James Madison
knows as much when, in calling for the "preservation of the [Amer-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 192.
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ican] system [of government] in its purity, its symmetry, and its
authenticity," he adds, "this can only be done by a steady atten-
tion and sacred regard to the chartered boundaries."8 "Steady at-
tention" includes the skill to find authenticity and reconstruct
symmetry; "sacred regard" signifies the appreciation of the ideals
and the history of continuity that enable vision. Arguably, both are
terribly lacking in our own day. A text-oriented culture requires
the knowledge of the scholar, the craft of the writer, the sympathy
of the accomplished reader, and the tough-mindedness of the polit-
ical leader to unite in an act of perception and articulation. Only a
balanced awareness of the vitality and integrity of language can
hope to safeguard the knowledge of chartered boundaries.
An image-oriented culture, increasingly our own, loses these ca-
pacities by trivializing them and glossing over the complexity of
the combinations. If our regard remains sacred, it often appears
superficial, and our attention seems unsteady because less prac-
ticed. We have forgotten how to read the Constitution for our-
selves in all its generic strength, manipulative brilliance, cunning
restraint, and practiced eloquence-the primary qualities that
made it possible. Recovery of this lost text should be considered
more than an intellectual exercise. When John Adams announces
that national virtue comes not from heaven but from the use of
reason and the senses in a well-ordered constitution, he under-
stands a well-ordered constitution to be a very difficult thing to
comprehend.87 Inevitably, preservation requires the same level of
understanding. The Founders believe in an absolute connection be-
tween personal knowledge and national well-being; the two, to-
gether, lead on to virtue. Here, if anywhere, is the positive ideal of
the secular Enlightenment, but Adams inserts a characteristic cau-
tionary note that we would do well to remember. If the virtue of
this world is easier to assess, history demonstrates that it is also
infinitely harder to maintain.88
86. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 429 (G. Hunt ed. 1910-1911).
87. 4 C. Adams, supra note 19, at 291-93; 6 id. at 219-20.
88. 6 id. at 205-08.
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